Search results for "Asymmetric information"
showing 10 items of 10 documents
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: A Multivariate Ordered Regression Approach
2018
The positive correlation (PC) test is the standard procedure used in the empirical literature to detect the existence of asymmetric information in insurance markets. This article describes a new tool to implement an extension of the PC test based on a new family of regression models, the multivariate ordered logit, designed to study how the joint distribution of two or more ordered response variables depends on exogenous covariates. We present an application of our proposed extension of the PC test to the Medigap health insurance market in the United States. Results reveal that the risk–coverage association is not homogeneous across coverage and risk categories, and depends on individual so…
Extortion, firm's size and the sectoral allocation of capital
2014
Extortion of firms is a typical activity of organized crime such as Mafia. We develop a simple principal-agent model to find the Mafia-optimal extortion as a function of firm’s observable characteristics, specifically firm’s size. We test the predictions of the model on a unique dataset on extortion in Sicily, the Italian region where Mafia is most active. Our empirical findings show that i) extortion moderately increases with firm’s size ii) extortion is regressive, the average extortion rate ranging from approximately 40% of operating profits for small firms to 2% for large firms iii) extortion turns average cost function decreasing, therefore influencing market competition
Collusion Constrained Equilibrium
2018
First published: 01 February 2018 This is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0 (http://econtheory.org) We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible plans to best achieve its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This allows groups to put positive probability on alternatives …
Insights on Partial Information Sharing in Supply Chain dynamics
2015
This paper provides an assessment of partial Information Sharing (IS) in Supply Chain (SC). We study the dynamics of collaborative multi-echelon structure, characterized by an increasing level of information visibility among partners. To do so, we mathematically model six four-echelon serial SCs via difference equations and conduct numerical simulations on the basis of a robust design of experiment. Results shows how (1) as the extent of IS increases, the performance of whole SC improves as well, and (2) the impact of IS depends not on which particular members are involved but on the number of collaborative members.
Don't tell us: the demand for secretive bahaviour
2009
International audience
Managerial Behavior in the Lab: Information Disclosure, Decision Process and Leadership Style
2019
This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preference…
Incentive and Selection Effects of Medigap Insurance on Inpatient Care
2012
The Medicare program, which provides insurance coverage to the elderly in the United States, does not protect them fully against high out-of-pocket costs. For this reason private supplementary insurance, named Medigap, has been available to cover Medicare gaps. This paper studies how Medigap affects the utilization of inpatient care, separating the incentive and selection effects of supplementary insurance. For this purpose, we use two alternative estimation methods: a standard recursive bivariate probit and a discrete multivariate finite mixture model. We find that estimated incentive effects are modest and quite similar across models. On the other hand, there seems to be very significant …
The Economics of Extortion: Theory and Evidence on the Sicilian Mafia
2019
This paper studies extortion of firms operating in legal sectors by a profit-maximizing criminal organization. We develop a simple principal-agent model under asymmetric information to find the Mafia-optimal extortion as a function of firms' observable characteristics, namely size and sector. We test the predictions of the model on a unique dataset on extortion in Sicily, the Italian region where the most powerful criminal organization, the Mafia, operates. In line with our theoretical model, our empirical findings show that extortion is strongly concave in firm's size and highly regressive. The percentage of profits appropriated by Mafia ranges from 40% for small firms to 2% for large firm…
Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
2021
Recent advances in information and communication technologies have increased the incentives for firms to acquire information about rivals. These advances may have major implications for market entry because they make it easier for potential entrants to gather valuable information about, for example, an incumbent’s cost structure. However, little theoretical research has actually analyzed this question. This paper advances the literature by extending a one-sided asymmetric information version of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1982) limit pricing model. Here, the entrant is allowed access to an intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision that generates a noisy signal on the incumbent’s cost struct…
Testing For Asymmetric Information In Insurance Markets With Unobservable Types
2008
In two important recent papers, Finkelstein and McGarry [25] and Finkelstein and Poterba [28] propose a new test for asymmetric information in insurance markets that considers explicitly unobserved heterogeneity in insurance demand. In this paper we propose an alternative implementation of the Finkelstein-McGarry-Poterba test based on the identification of unobservable types by use of finite mixture models. The actual implementation of our test follows some recent advances on marginal modelling as applied to latent class analysis; formal testing procedures for the null of asymmetric information and for the hypothesis that private information is indeed multidimensional can be performed by im…